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ZDENĚK KOUDELKA*
Changes in the Position of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce 
in the Czech Republic
Since the transformation of the Prosecution into the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce in Bohemia, 
Moravia and Silesia (Czech Republic), it has been discussed whether the current model is 
correct and what both the internal relations between the individual levels of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce hierarchy and the external relations of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce as 
a system with other supreme administrative bodies should be like. Supporters of various 
models can ﬁ nd foreign examples of these models because the patterns of functioning of the 
Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ces in various European countries are different. 
Basically, it is possible to specify several prototypal countries and rank them starting 
with the one where the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce has the closest connection to the Ministry 
of Justice and ending with a system characterized by a total separation of these two bodies:
1.   Poland – Public prosecution is not mentioned in the Polish Constitution at all. The 
Law on Public Prosecution was changed in the year 2010 and the separated 
function of the Prosecutor General was established.1 Prosecutor General is 
appointed for six years by the President of the republic, the proposal comes from 
both the Prosecution Land Council and the Justice Land Council. The appointment 
is not a subject to contrasignation.2 The Prosecutor General cannot be appointed 
repeatedly. Both Land Prosecutor for Civil Prosecution who is appointed by the 
Prime Minister on the proposal of the Prosecutor General and the Supreme Military 
Prosecutor are subordinated to the Prosecutor General. 
  In the period 1990–2010 the Prosecution was subordinated to the Ministry of 
Justice and the Minister performed the function of the Prosecutor General at the 
same time.3 This American model was applied also during the Second Polish 
Republic 1919–1939, when the Minister of Justice performed the function of the 
Prosecutor General at the same time. 
2.  Ireland – the Supreme Prosecutor is not personally linked to the Government. The 
Supreme Prosecutor is not a member of the Government. However, he or she is 
deﬁ ned as the Government’s adviser. He or she is appointed by the President on 
the proposal of the Prime Minister and is obliged to resign on the Prime Minister’s 
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1 On 31 March 2010 Andrzej Seremet took the ofﬁ ce of the Prosecutor General.
2 It is a controversial matter because the decisions of the President of the republic are subject to 
contrasignation on the basis of a common law. A change of the Constitution is being considered–it 
should be directly mentioned in the Constitution that the President of the republic appoints the 
Prosecutor General without the need of the contrasignation of the Prime Minister.  
3 Kudrna, J.–Banaszkiewicz, B.: Postavení prokuratury v právním řádu Polské republiky 
(Position of the Public Prosecutors’s Ofﬁ ce in the Polish Legal System). Státní zastupitelství, (2008) 
11–12.
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request. If he or she does not step down, the President recalls him on the proposal 
of the Prime Minister.4 
3.  Austria – the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce is a part of the Ministry of Justice 
department. There is a Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce in Austria with the 
Supreme Prosecutor at its head. However, the Supreme Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce 
operates only within the framework of the Supreme Court and is not a part of the 
common hierarchical system together with the lower High Land Prosecutor’s 
Ofﬁ ces, which are directly subordinated–as well as the Supreme Prosecutor’s 
Ofﬁ ce–to the Ministry of Justice. The Minister is superior both in terms of 
administration and in terms of competence. This model had been applied in our 
country since the middle of the 19th century until 1952. The Public Prosecution 
has been ranked to the judiciary since 20085 by the Amendment to the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, the administration of the public prosecution has not changed.
4.  Czech Republic (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) – there is a system of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce with the Supreme Prosecutor at its head who is appointed by 
the Government. Relations of superiority and subordination exist between the 
hierarchical levels, particularly between two immediately subsequent levels and 
with respect to superior levels in the areas speciﬁ ed by law. The whole system is a 
part of the Ministry of Justice department, while the Ministry is not superior to the 
Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce in terms of competence but it is superior in the matters 
of administration, especially budgetary administration.
5.  Slovakia – the Prosecution is an independent system of administrative bodies with 
the Prosecutor General at its head who is appointed by the President on the 
proposal of the Parliament. The Prosecution has a separate chapter of the state 
budget. This model had been applied in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia since 1953 
until 1993.
6.  Hungary – the Prosecution is an independent system of administrative bodies and 
it is not subordinate to the Government, as in Slovakia. However, the Constitution 
provides for the accountability of the Prosecutor General to the Parliament, by 
which he or she is also elected.6 
7.  France, Italy – the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce is a part of the judicial authority. 
It is necessary to emphasize that, from the perspective of the current understanding of 
a material liberal democratic state, a good administration of public matters, which also 
concerns the Public Prosecution, is determined by the political regime of the state rather 
than by the legal characteristics of the individual bodies of public authority. It cannot be 
denied that the Public Prosecution participated on the commission of judicial crimes in our 
4 Art. 30 of the Constitution of Ireland. Klokočka, V.–Wagnerová, E.: Ústavy států Evropské 
unie (Constitutions of the EU Member States). 1st ed., Praha, 1997, 170.
5 Judiciary itself is ranked as Part B together with Part A (Administration) to the Catch III of the 
Constitution which is called Executive Power. Art. 90a of the Constitution of the Republic of Austria 
from the 10. 11. 1920 in the statutory text of the Constitutional Law No. 2/2008 BGBl.
6 Art. 52 para. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary of 1949. Klokočka, V.–
Wagnerová, E.: Ústavy států Evropské uni (Constitutions of the EU Member States). 2nd ed., Praha, 
2005, 168.; Halasz, I.: Postavenie generálnej prokuratúry v maďarskom ústavnom systéme po roku 
1989 (Position of the General Prosecutor in Hungarian Legal System after 1989). Státní zastupitelství, 
(2008) 11–12.
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country in the period between 1948 and 1952, while its legal deﬁ nition originated in the 
relatively liberal and legally consistent Austrian state of second half of the 19th century and 
continued to be in force in the democratic ﬁ rst Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938). On the 
contrary, the Public Prosecution established according to the Soviet model by the statutes 
adopted during the period of the worst totality in 1952 managed to function in an 
organizationally unchanged form after the end of totality within the framework of the 
democratic state in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia until 1993 and continues to function in 
Slovakia or Hungary until today. The outcome of the activity of a state administration body, 
including the Public Prosecution, is not primarily determined by its legal and organizational 
regulation but instead by the essence of the regime of the State; whether it is a democracy, 
totality, dictatorship or even despotism.
However, if we think about possible changes in the legal regulation of the position of 
the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, we can identify three basic 
areas of change: one of them is formal–constitutional regulation, and two of them are 
budgetary and personal administration. 
Constitutional Regulation
The present constitutional regulation in the Czech Republic is very brief and is limited to 
one article within the chapter dealing with the executive power in the section regulating the 
Government.7 The Constitution provides–without a possibility of the legislator to change 
it–that the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce:
1.  is a part of the executive power and has to have a relationship with the government. 
However, this relationship is not further speciﬁ ed.
2.  represents the Public Prosecution before the criminal courts. 
All other areas of regulation are entrusted only to a statute by the Constitution, 
including the possibility to extend the competence of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce on non-
criminal issues as well, which is actually realized under the current legal regulation. 
There is a requirement to extend the constitutional regulation of the Public Prosecution, 
e.g. according to the Slovakian model. However, briefness of the Constitution can be an 
advantage for any institution if the Constitution enables the desired situation to be 
accomplished by an ordinary statute, as in the Czech Republic. Almost all changes of the 
regulation of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce can be realized through amendments of statutes 
without a necessity to amend the Constitution. The Constitution only provides for the 
criminal competence of the Public Prosecution in criminal proceedings. Although this can 
seem obvious, for example the Slovak Constitution paradoxically does not provide for such 
a competence of the Public Prosecution.8 The absolutely dominant activity of the Slovak 
Public Prosecution in criminal proceedings is provided for only by a statute. Theoretically, 
the law could withdraw the criminal competence of the Slovak Public Prosecution and 
entrust it to a newly established Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce. The Slovak Public Prosecution 
which is provided for in the Constitution could therefore be deprived of its competence by a 
statute and be left with a minor competence to protect the rights of the people and the State 
without any further speciﬁ cation of measures available to realize its authority. It would 
become another Public Defender of Rights (Ombudsman) as it would protest against 
unlawful actions without a capability to provide a remedy for the unlawfulness as it would 
7 Art. 80 of the Constitution of the Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia No. 1/1993 Coll.
8 Art. 149 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic No 460/1992 Coll.
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only be left with a limited entitlement of the Slovak Prosecutor General to ﬁ le a petition to 
the Constitutional Court in Košice9 e.g. regarding the unlawfulness of generally binding 
regulations of local self-administration.
Briefness and comprehensibility of the legal language are good qualities of the Czech 
Constitution. If all the so-called reasonable requirements for amendments of the Constitution 
(referendum, Supreme Audit Ofﬁ ce, local self-administration) were summarized, the 
Constitution would be extended to the enormous size of the Portuguese Constitution.10 
Moreover, enforcing amendments of the Constitution is always very difﬁ cult. Not only the 
qualiﬁ ed three-ﬁ fth majority of all Members of the Chamber of Deputies and the present 
Senators is required, but the Senate also cannot be outvoted and it is moreover not bound 
by the 30-day period for discussing the proposal as it is with regard to ordinary statutes. An 
amendment of the Constitution can therefore easily “fall under the table” without being 
formally dismissed. This can happen if the Senate does not discuss the proposal until the 
election of Members of the Chamber of Deputies take place. Due to the principle of 
discontinuity in the legislative process,11 all the draft laws, including constitutional laws, 
which had not been discussed until the election of the Members of the Chamber of Deputies 
have taken place, cannot be discussed in the newly elected Chamber of Deputies. This is 
also the case with the draft laws returned from the Senate or the laws vetoed by the President 
of the Republic. The veto of the President or the Senate thus becomes absolute.12
Also the statistics shows that everyone who proposes a constitutional amendment asks 
for its non-acceptance. During the term of ofﬁ ce of the Chamber of Deputies from 2002 
until 2006, eighteen proposals of constitutional laws have been ﬁ led while only three of 
them have been accepted; two concerning the change of borders with Austria and Germany 
and one concerning the referendum on the accession of the Czech Republic to the European 
Union.13 During the term of ofﬁ ce of the Chamber of Deputies from 2006 until 2009, 11 
proposals of the constitutional amendments have been ﬁ led while none of them has been 
accepted.14 This reﬂ ects a stability of the Constitution, which is positive. It can be concluded 
that if it is possible to achieve a certain objective by a statute, it is necessary to do it in this 
way and not by extending the Constitution. It can be compared to a situation when someone 
climbs up to the ﬁ fth ﬂ oor while the door is open with the functioning stairs behind it which 
he or she could use to get to the ﬁ fth ﬂ oor more easily. If we make another comparison with 
Slovakia concerning the Public Defender of Rights (Ombudsman), whose position is even 
regulated together with the Prosecution in Slovakia in the common Chapter 8 of the 
Constitution, we can see that there is no difference in the content of competence between 
    9 Art. 130 para. 1 let e) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.
10 The Constitution of the Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia has 115 articles. The Constitution of 
the Republic of Portugal of 2nd April 1976 has 298 articles.
11 Sec. 121 para. 1 of the Act No. 90/1995 Coll., on the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of 
Deputies.
12 Filip, J.: Vybrané kapitoly ke studiu Ústavního práva (Selected chapters. Study of the 
Constitutional Law). 2nd ed., Brno, 2001, 283.
13 Prints of the Chamber of Deputies 4th term of ofﬁ ce  Nos 20, 50, 81, 90, 95, 115, 172, 192, 
208, 249, 349, 485, 513, 609, 914, 937, 980, 1130, prints Nos 50, 249, 609 have been accepted. 
14 Prints of the Chamber of Deputies 5th term of ofﬁ ce Nos 16, 42, 134, 146, 169, 192, 332, 
381, 524, 747 and 795. Also constitutional law about referendum to particular questions has not been 
accepted–Prints of the Chamber of Deputies Nos 147, 477, 490. Only the constitutional law No. 
195/2009 Coll. about shortening of 5th term of ofﬁ ce of the Chamber of Deputies has been accepted. 
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the Slovak Ombudsman, whose position is regulated by the Constitution, and the 
Ombudsman in the Czech Republic (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia), whose position is 
regulated by a statute only. No constitutional amendments are necessary for changes in the 
position of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce. The present Constitution allows to establish the 
Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce which is identical with the Minister of Justice as in Poland, but 
also to establish the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce which is independent of the Government to 
a great extend as in Slovakia. 
Concerning the extend of the constitutional regulation, all constitutions are generally 
very brief and usually, in contrast to the Czech Constitution, contain provisions on the 
appointment of the Prosecutor General into ofﬁ ce while the appointment of other Public 
Prosecutors as well as other organizational issues are left to be regulated by statutes.15 This 
is the case of the Slovak Constitution which regulates the Public Prosecution together with 
the Ombudsperson in Chapter 8,16 but there are only three articles not subdivided into 
paragraphs which actually deal with the Prosecution. The text of the one article of the Czech 
Constitution which deals with the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce, which is however subdivided 
into two paragraphs, is not much shorter. Moreover, the Slovak regulation actually contains 
only a provision on the appointment of the Prosecutor General by the President. As regards 
the content of the constitutional regulation, the Slovak Constitution regulates, if something 
at all, only a small part of the personal administration concerning the appointment of the 
chief of the Public Prosecution. Concerning the budgetary administration, constitutions do 
not regulate this issue. 
Budgetary Administration
Money makes the world go round but it is not polite to talk about it on solemn occasions. 
From this point of view, it does not come as a surprise that the constitutions which regulate 
the basics of the functioning of the State do not mention money very often, with the 
exception of the state budget procedure. Only a minority of constitutions contains more 
detailed provisions dealing with ﬁ nancing of the State. Above all, they regulate the 
relationship between the State and local self-administrative units.17 Constitutions do not 
regulate the budgetary administration of the Public Prosecution; its regulation is left to 
statutes. The Public Prosecution as a system of state organs always draws its resources from 
the state budget which is passed by the Parliament. It is crucial whether the Prosecution has 
a separate chapter of the state budget or whether it is included in the chapter of the Ministry 
of Justice. Whatever the personal administration of the Prosecution is, the budgetary 
autonomy strengthens the position of the Public Prosecution in all models and its absence 
weakens it on the contrary. 
15 A sole exception is the Art. 51 Sec. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary of 1949 
which even establishes the supervision of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce over the service of a sentence 
on the constitutional level. See Klokočka, V.–Wagnerová, E.: ibid. 168.
16 Moreover, since the Chapter 8 of the Constitution of Slovak Republic No. 460/1992 Coll. 
came into force until the establishment of the Public Defender of Rights by the Constitutional Act No. 
90/2001 Coll., the whole chapter dealt solely with the Prosecution.
17 Chapter 10 of the Organic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949 which, 
compared to a standard constitutional regulation, regulates the public ﬁ nances in great detail, is an 
exception in this regard. In: Klokočka, V.–Wagnerová, E.: Ústavy států Evropské unie (Constitutions 
of the EU Member States). 1st ed., Praha, 1997, 273–279.
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A separate chapter of the state budget for the Public Prosecution allows for a better 
satisfaction of the needs of the system with regard to a deeper understanding of its problems 
and prevents the transferring of the saved money outside the system. It actually removes the 
well-known pressure on spending everything as the savings would otherwise be transferred 
to satisfy other needs than those of the Public Prosecution. Moreover, a separate chapter of 
the state budget for the Public Prosecution fulﬁ lls the principle of subsidiarity preferred by 
the European Union18 which provides that the public authority including the administration 
shall, if possible, be performed on the level which is concerned. This is usually presented 
within the framework of local administration19 but the principle can be applied to the public 
administration as a whole including the administration of individual government 
departments. 
As the proverb says, let every man praise the bridge he goes over. It is possible that the 
Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce will tend to be more open to the views of the Minister who 
decides over ﬁ nancing of its needs. This is one of the reasons why it is preferable to 
introduce an autonomous budgetary administration of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce through 
a separate chapter of the state budget. However, administrative autonomy is connected with 
responsibility for the entrusted ﬁ nancial resources. In that case, the Public Prosecutor’s 
Ofﬁ ce would have to perform all the duties of an administrator of a chapter of the state 
budget and its management would be controlled like the management of other state organs 
who are administrators of chapters of the state budget, including the supervision of the 
Supreme Audit Ofﬁ ce. The Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce would also have to defend its 
requirements against both the Minister of Finance and the Government when the state 
budget is being drafted as well as during the subsequent budget procedure in the Parliament. 
Currently, the Constitutional Court is the only judicial organ which has a separate chapter 
of the state budget although the number of employees of the Constitutional Court is by far 
smaller than the number of employees of the system of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce. The 
Ofﬁ ce of the Public Defender of Rights or the Ofﬁ ce for the Protection of Competition, 
which are also much smaller, have separate budgetary chapters as well because the 
importance of a certain budgetary autonomy is accented in these areas, too.
When introducing the budgetary autonomy it is either possible to establish a single 
chapter of the state budget under the administration of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce or 
to establish three chapters with a separate chapter for the Supreme Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce and 
two other chapters for the High Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ces, a part of which would be the budgetary 
18 Art. 3b of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. See Novotná, M.: Princip 
subsidiarity v právu Evropských společenství (Principle of Subsidiarity in the EC Law). Právník, 
(1995) 3. and Marcou, G.: New Tendencies of Local Government Development in Europe. In: Bennett, 
R. J.: Local Government in the New Europe. London, 1993.
19 Art. 4 para. 3 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government No. 181/1999 Coll. 
determines that the administration of public affairs shall be above all entrusted to the administrative 
bodies which are closest to the citizens while admitting the responsibility of other subject has to 
correspond with the scope and character of the task as well as with the requirements of effectiveness 
and economic efﬁ ciency. Slovakia has made a reservation to provide for a non-biding effect of this 
article because of the strong Hungarian minority in the south of Slovakia. See Kadečka, S.: Svobodná 
normotvorba obcí 1 (Free legislation of the local communities). Moderní obec, (2000) 9, 35. and 
Kadečka, S.: Právo obcí a krajů v České republice (Law of the municipals and districts in the Czech 
Republic). Praha, 2003, 8–9.
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administration of the subordinated Regional and District Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ces. There is a 
historical analogy as there was a separate administration of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce 
and the High Land Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ces (one for Bohemia and one for Moravia and Silesia), 
to which the Regional Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce was subordinated, during the monarchy and 
Czechoslovakia although the Supreme and High Provincial Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ces did not 
have separate chapters of the state budget as they were–independently on one another–
connected to the budget of the Ministry of Justice. This was repeated, already with separate 
chapters of the state budget, in the period from 1969 until 1992 when there was a separate 
administration of the General Prosecutions of the Republics and their subordinated Public 
Prosecutions which existed in parallel with the Prosecution General of Czechoslovakia.
Personal Administration
A majority of constitutions do not deal with the appointment of lower-level Public 
Prosecutors and leave this issue to be regulated by ordinary statutes. Prosecutors are 
appointed to their functions either by the Minister of Justice or by the Prosecutor General. 
As regards the Prosecutor General, constitutions often contain regulation of his appointment 
to function. He or she is usually appointed by the Head of State on the proposal of the 
relevant body. Appointment of the Prosecutor General by the Head of State corresponds to 
the appointment of other chiefs of supreme bodies in the European countries.20 Such bodies 
are usually the Government (the Prime Minister), the Parliament or other body. Even though 
the subject that makes the proposal differs, the rule for appointing the Prosecutor General 
provides that an agreement of two subjects is required which ensures greater agreement on 
the appointment of a particular person. Because the process of removing from ofﬁ ce is 
analogical to the process of appointing, unless it is provided for otherwise, it also ensures 
greater independence of the appointed person on the appointer as an agreement of a 
minimum of two subjects is required also with regard to dismissal.
As regards the Czech regulation, a change in the appointment of the Supreme 
Prosecutor is possible. Currently, the Supreme Prosecutor is appointed by the Government 
on the proposal of the Minister of Justice.21 Although these are two subjects as well, they 
are politically close. A possible change could provide for the appointment of the Supreme 
Prosecutor by the President on the proposal of the Government. The appointment would be 
subject to countersignature by the Prime Minister.22 It is clear, even without an explicit 
regulation, that the proposal within the Government would be made by the Minister of 
Justice as a chief of the representing–even though not the governing–department of justice. 
It is unusual for the Czech statutes to provide explicitly that if the government has a certain 
right to make proposals, it has to do so on the basis of a proposal of a particular Minister. It 
is a custom that the suggestion regarding the Government’s proposal is made by the Minister 
20 The Hungarian Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the National Assembly on the 
proposal of the President, is an exception. Art. 52 Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary of 1949 which even provides for a supervision of the Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce over the service of 
a sentence on the constitutional level. Klokočka, V. – Wagnerová, E.: Ústavy států Evropské unie 
(Constitutions of the EU Member States). 2nd ed., Praha, 2005, 168.
21 Sec. 9 of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce Act, No. 283/1993 Coll.
22 Art. 63 paras 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.
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of the department which is concerned, however, it is not explicitly regulated in the statutes.23 
When the law provides that the decision of the President of the Czech Republic is 
conditioned by the proposal of the Government, there is no provision regarding the 
Government being bound by the proposal of a particular Minister. 
Of course it is possible to involve the Chamber of Deputies into the system of 
appointing as well. However, the experience shows that the appointment to positions which 
are appointed by the Chamber of Deputies become subject to bargaining between political 
parties and a part of a political trade-off. So we will elect you the Supreme Prosecutor if 
you elect our candidates into the Czech Television Council etc. Moreover, the experience 
has already shown that the Chamber of Deputies is sometimes not able to elect the successor, 
as in the case of the President and the Vice-President of the Supreme Audit Ofﬁ ce.24 
However, even if the Chamber of Deputies was involved in the appointment process, the 
Government cannot be excluded from it, even though it is only in the position of a proposer, 
because the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce is subsumed under the Government within the 
framework of the executive power in the Czech Republic. It is also not possible, under the 
current model of personal and budgetary administration of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce 
by the Ministry of Justice, that the Minister of Justice would not have an opportunity to at 
least express his or her opinion regarding the appointment of the Supreme Prosecutor. From 
a long-term perspective, the mutual permanent conﬂ ictual relationship between the Minister 
of Justice and the Supreme Prosecutor, as it was between the Minister Pavel Němec and the 
Supreme Prosecutor Marie Benešová in the period from 2004 to 2005, is not sustainable. 
Such a conﬂ ict does not lead to a good administration of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce. The 
most suitable solution within the framework of the present constitutional regulation is to 
make a change in the personal administration of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce so that the 
Supreme Prosecutor is appointed by the President of the Czech Republic on the proposal of 
the Government. Two subjects should also be involved into the appointment procedure of 
other chief Prosecutors. Preferably, they should be from the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce, i.e. 
the District Prosecutor would be appointed on the proposal of the Regional Prosecutor. The 
Regional Prosecutor would be appointed by the Supreme Prosecutor on the proposal of the 
High Prosecutor and the High Prosecutor would be appointed by the Supreme Prosecutor 
with the consent of the Minister of Justice or by the President of the Czech Republic with 
the countersignature of the Prime Minister on the proposal of the Supreme Prosecutor. The 
President of the Czech Republic appoints not only the Presidents of the Supreme Court and 
the Supreme Administrative Court but also the Presidents of the High Courts25 (in Prague 
for Bohemia and in Olomouc for Moravia and Silesia).
23 For example the President appoints the Chief of the General Staff on the proposal of the 
Government without being explicitly provided, that it is the Minister of Defense, who initiates the 
proposal in the government; it is a legal custom. Sec. 7 para. 4 of the Armed Forces Act No. 
219/1999 Sb.
24 The President, Lubor Voleník, died on 19 June 2003 and his successor, František Dohnal, was 
appointed by the President only on 4 November 2005 on the proposal of the Chamber of Deputies of 
26 October 2005. The Vice-president, Dušan Tešnar, resigned on 10 September 2007 while the 
Chamber of Deputies elected the candidate on his position, Miloslav Kala, only on 30 October 2008 
and he was appointed by President of the Republic on 13 November 2008.
25 Art. 62 let f) of the Constitution of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Sec. 13 para. 2 of the 
Administrative Justice Code No. 150/2002 Coll. Sec. 103 para. 1 of the Courts of Justice and Judges 
Act No. 6/2002 Coll.
